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The future is purchased by the
present
Samuel Johnson (1709-1784)
I would gladly pay you Tuesday
for a Hamburger today
Wimpy (early 20th century)
You used to be a smoker. Just
recently you decided, like millions
of other smokers each year, that
you wanted to quit. The reasons
seemed obvious: future health
problems, avoiding the disapproval
from your family and coworkers
and the nagging feeling that you
were not in full control of your own
behavior. You are sitting in a pub
with a friend who smokes. He has
just lit a cigarette and offers you
one too. This is the moment to tell
him about your new plans. Or is it?
Suddenly, you have second
thoughts. You are reminded how
much you like the aroma of
tobacco and the pleasure you get
from your first puff. After all, what
is one cigarette? If you stop
smoking tomorrow, it does not
matter what you do tonight. You
accept the offer and start smoking.
Like 81% of others that tried, your
attempt to quit failed within the
first month [1]. What went wrong?
We often choose alternatives
that are tempting in the short-term
over alternatives that are more
optimal in the long run. This self-
defeating behavior is even more
perplexing, as we are almost
always aware of the fact that our
choice is not in our own best self-
interest. Traditionally, it has been
assumed in the behavioral
sciences, especially in economics,
that decisions are perfectly
rational, in other words that we
choose the alternative that has
the most value for us [2]. This
assumption is clearly wrong. We
are persistently tempted by
immediate gratification. The
resulting behavioral problems are
ubiquitous and range from the
mildly dysfunctional, such as
procrastination, to the clinically
relevant such as overeating and
addiction. We do not seem to
choose what we value most. How
is this possible?
A new paper by Kalenscher et
al. [3], in this issue of Current
Biology, reports a first, pioneering
step towards an understanding of
this phenomenon. The authors
decided to study impulsivity and
self-control in the pigeon, an
animal model with a long history of
study in delayed-reward choice
tasks [4]. These experiments on
pigeons have an identical
structure to experiments that have
been done with human subjects
[5]. So for comparison, the pigeon
experiment will be translated into
the conditions faced by a human
in a similar experiment. In a typical
experiment a hungry pigeon is
placed into a box, where it is faced
with two different keys in one side
of the box. It has learned that
pecking of a key will lead to the
opening of a shutter in the wall of
the box, which allows access to
food. Pecking one of the keys
results in access to food after only
a brief waiting time, but the shutter
also closes faster, so that the total
amount of food that the pigeon
can get is small. Pecking the other
key results in longer food access,
but the bird has to wait longer. (In
the case of humans this would be
equivalent to a choice between,
for example, $1 today or $10 at
some later point.) 
To find out how pigeons handle
the trade off between reward
amount and delay, the
experimenter varies the longer
delay period. First, let’s start with
equal waiting times for both
rewards. (We would ask our
human subject “Would you prefer
$1 or $10 today?”) Naturally, the
pigeon will exclusively choose the
key leading to more food. Next, we
slowly lengthen the waiting time of
the large food amount option.
(“Would you prefer $1 today or $10
tomorrow, in a week, in a month,
in a year....”) The option where the
gratification is delayed becomes
less and less attractive, until the
pigeon switches its preference
and chooses the smaller, sooner
option instead of the larger, later
option. The length of the waiting
time that the pigeon or the human
is willing to accept is related to its
impulsiveness. Typically, a hungry
pigeon is not willing to wait longer
than a few seconds; humans are
less impulsive and are willing to
wait from days to decades,
depending on the reward.
Nevertheless, the principal
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Neuroeconomics: The Shadow
of the Future
Humans and other animals tend to disregard future benefits and
costs when choosing between immediate and delayed gratification.
This tendency can lead to the choice of options that are not in
one’s own long-term interest. A new study looks at the
neurophysiological basis of this self-defeating behavior.
structure of the discounting is the
same in humans, pigeons and all
other animals that have been
tested in this kind of
experiment [6].
Discounting the future in itself is
not irrational; after all “the best-
laid plans of mice and men often
go awry”. Taking into
consideration the risk that a future
reward might not manifest itself
comes down to estimating the
total probability of this unfortunate
outcome. This implies that we
should reduce the value of a future
reward by a constant factor per
time unit that reflects this
probability. The resulting discount
function is an exponential function
similar to the one used by financial
markets. Exponential discounting
implies a constant preference over
time. The preference between a
smaller sooner and a larger later
reward does not change as the
smaller sooner reward becomes
imminent. However, empirical
studies in humans [5] and animals
[4] have not supported an
exponential discounting function.
Instead these studies show a clear
tendency to discount expected
outcomes proportionate to their
delays. This results in a hyperbolic
discounting function as first
suggested by Mazur [4].
Kalenscher et al. [3] also report
that the behavior of their pigeons
is best described by a hyperbolic
function. In contrast to exponential
discounting, hyperbolic
discounting leads to a preference
reversal between the immediate
and the delayed reward in the
period just before the immediate
reward is due [7]. This explains the
temptation to choose the smaller
reward if it becomes immediately
available.
Kalenscher et al. [3] recorded
from neurons in the Nidopallium
caudolaterale, a nucleus in the
forebrain of birds that receives
input from multiple sensory
systems. They found a small
group of neurons that were active
after the pigeon had made its
choice and while it waited for the
food to become available. This
indicated that the neuronal signal
might be related to the
expectation of reward in the
future. The intensity of the
neuronal discharge increased with
the length of access to the food
that the pigeon could expect and
therefore reflected the amount of
reward. Cells of this type have
been described before [8].
Critically, Kalenscher et al. [3]
found that, for a given amount of
reward, these cells also
decreased their activity the later
the reward was delivered. Thus,
the neurons integrate  information
about the size of the expected
reward and how far in the future it
will become available. This is a
new finding in this study [3].
Strikingly, these cells behave in
the same way as the hyperbolic
value functions that can be
derived from behavior. The best
way to interpret these new
findings is that this newly
described group of cells in the
pigeon brain carries information
about the subjective expected
value of a recently executed goal-
directed action.
Finding cells with this property
is exciting, because it takes a
theoretical concept from
economics and makes it a
variable that can be measured
directly. This should allow us to
reverse the traditional logic.
Instead of inferring value from the
behavioral choices, we could use
the neuronal value signal to
predict choices. This links the
current study with the emerging
field of neuroeconomics. The
mathematical assumptions that
form the basis of current rational
choice theory do not adequately
describe how humans make
decisions. Neuroeconomics
promises a new perspective on
this and other problems in
decision theory by opening the
‘black box’ [9,10]. Understanding
the neuronal mechanism
underlying choice will allow
economics to be built upon an
empirical model of decision-
making.
Like all stimulating scientific
work the Kalenscher et al. [3]
paper not only gives new insights,
but it also opens up new
questions. One of them is how the
findings of this study in a bird
relate to the situation in the
primate. The brains of birds and
mammals are separated by
approximately 286 million years of
evolution [11]. Nevertheless, the
fact that the hyperbolic
discounting function is shared
between pigeons and humans
makes it likely that we will find
similar neuronal signals in
primates. It is not clear though,
what part of the mammalian brain
is functionally equivalent to the
part of the avian brain where the
subjective value signals were
found. In earlier work, the authors
of this study [12] have presented
evidence that point towards a
functional similarity between the
Nidopallium caudolaterale and the
prefrontal cortex. We will need
further studies to see how far this
similarity goes and which part of
the primate prefrontal cortex, if
any, is the closest analog to this
nucleus in the bird forebrain.
Another important question
relates to the decision itself. The
neuronal activity that Kalenscher
et al. [3] describe starts only after
the choice has already been
made. Clearly, the two alternative
outcomes and the value that the
animal attaches to them must be
represented during the decision
stage. Otherwise no comparison
is possible. Likewise, it is unclear
at this point what the actual
mechanism of decision-making is
in this paradigm. At least three
different mechanisms are
possible. First, the decision could
be the result of direct competition
of expected reward signals that
are associated with the two
options. This mechanism would
simply select the option
associated with the highest
expected reward value. Secondly,
the decision could be the result of
competition between two different
neuronal systems. One system
would support impulsive choices
and is mainly driven by the limbic
system. The other system would
support rational choices and is
mainly driven by the cognitive
system. It is not clear how realistic
this possibility is in the pigeon,
but it might play a role in primates
and in particular in humans [13].
Third, the decision might be
guided by an evaluation of past
reward. If a choice leads to less
reward than expected, the pigeon
switches to the other option. This
suggestion draws on models of
reinforcement learning that were
developed to explain the response
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of dopaminergic neurons in the
midbrain [10]. These neurons are
thought to represent the
mismatch between expected and
actually delivered reward. In this
scheme the newly discovered
neurons would provide one of the
compared signals.
Lesion studies would allow
exploring the exact causal role of
this avian brain area in the
delayed reward choice task.
Studies in rats have shown that
the lesion of the Nucleus
accumbens, a part of the
mammalian basal ganglia, leads
to more impulsive choices [14].
We started with the question
how humans can behave
irrationally. The fact that both
pigeons and humans discount
future reward in a hyperbolic
fashion turns this original question
around. Because of the nature of
our reward discounting we would
expect to always prefer immediate
gratification to what is in our long-
term interest. In this sense, the
smoker did the most natural thing.
What needs explanation is the
existence of rational behavior. If
not pigeons than at least humans
are sometimes able to overcome
their temptations and to exert
self-control. It is this that needs
an explanation. Pigeons, which
are rather impulsive, might not be
the best subjects to study these
control mechanisms. Primates
with their well-developed frontal
cortex might offer a better chance
to understand voluntary control of
behavior, a cognitive ability that is
of central importance in our life as
human beings [15]. This will allow
us to development better
treatments for substance
addiction, gambling, obesity, lack
of exercise and a whole host of
other important behavioral
problems in our modern world.
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Jeannie T. Lee
The phenomenon of sex
chromosome inactivation presents
one of the most fascinating
problems in biology. It is best
known in mammals, where
inactivation occurs in several
situations. In the female soma,
inactivation of a single X
chromosome ensures that XX and
XY individuals have equal X
chromosome dosage even though
they inherit an unequal number of
X chromosomes [1]. A second,
though less-recognized form of
inactivation takes place in males:
known as ‘meiotic sex
chromosome inactivation’ (MSCI),
the phenomenon silences both X
and Y during meiosis (Figure 1A)
[2]. Why this happens at all
remains mysterious, but in recent
years there have been
considerable advances in our
understanding of its evolution,
mechanism and potential
biological relevance. Most recently,
two papers from the Burgoyne
group [3,4] have revealed intriguing
new rules that govern MSCI. The
trigger, it seems, is unpaired DNA
at pachytene, the stage of meiosis
when homologous chromosomes
normally synapse (pair).
This is a startling discovery, as it
implies that the MSCI mechanism
may originate in a most improbable
biological progenitor — a moldy
fungus called Neurospora. As in
other organisms, meiosis in
Neurospora crassa is marked by
pairing of homologous
chromosomes in preparation for
segregation to haploid gametes. A
few years ago, Metzenberg and
colleagues [5] made the surprising
Sex Chromosome Inactivation:
The Importance of Pairing
In mammals, the process of making sperm is marked by
inactivation of sex chromosomes. Why and how does this happen?
The answer apparently lies in whether a chromosome finds a
pairing partner. Similar mechanisms in mold and worms reveal a
surprising and recurrent theme throughout evolution.
